### Topicality---1NC

#### Our interpretation is that the resolution should define the division of ground. It was negotiated and announced in advance providing both teams a reasonable opportunity to prepare. Only a textual reading of the resolution provides a predictable basis for research.

#### USFG means the three branches.

OECD 87. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The Control and Management of Government Expenditure. 179. Google Book.

1. Political and organizational structure of government

The United States America is a federal republic consisting of 50 states. States have their own constitutions and within each State there are at least two additional levels of government, generally designated as counties and cities, towns or villages. The relationships between different levels of government are complex and varied (see Section B for more information).

The Federal Government is composed of three branches: the legislative branch, the executive branch, and the judicial branch. Budgetary decisionmaking is shared primarily by the legislative and executive branches. The general structure of these two branches relative to budget formulation and execution is as follows.

#### ‘Resolved’ means to enact a policy by law.

Words and Phrases 64. Permanent Edition.

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### Prohibitions are laws

Collins Dictionary. "Prohibition definition and meaning". Accessed: 9-13-2021. https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/prohibition

Definition of 'prohibition'

prohibition

(proʊɪbɪʃən)

Word forms: plural prohibitions

1. COUNTABLE NOUN

A prohibition is a law or rule forbidding something.

...a prohibition on discrimination. [+ on]

...prohibitions against feeding birds at the airport. [+ against]

2. See also prohibit

#### The core antitrust laws are Sherman, Clayton, and FTC.

Thomas Horton 10. Professor of Law and Heidepriem Trial Advocacy Fellow, University of South Dakota School of Law. “Rediscovering Antitrust's Lost Values.” The University of New Hampshire Law Review. https://scholars.unh.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1305&context=unh\_lr

Part II of this Article discusses Congress’s historical balancing and blending of fundamental political, social, moral, and economic values to create a constitutional-like set of flexible laws that can be adapted to unforeseen and changing economic and political circumstances.22 Part II.A. briefly reviews some of the extensive scholarship addressing Congress’s balancing of values and objectives in its core antitrust laws including the Sherman, Clayton, and FTC Acts. Parts II.B. and C. explore the less-studied balancing of political, social, moral, and economic values and objectives in more recent antitrust legislation.23 Part II.B. specifically examines the legislative debates undergirding the passage of the HSR Act. 24 Part II.C. then turns to the debates and discourse that led to the passage of the NCRA in 1984 and the subsequent National Cooperative Production Amendments of 1993 and 2004. 25

#### Violation---they don’t defend USFG action that increases prohibitions on private sector business practices by expanding the scope of the core antitrust laws

#### Vote negative:

#### 1. Fairness – the Neg should win on average 50 percent of the time – any unfair advantage is a reason they should lose – their arguments are shaped by the drive to win, so presume their arguments are in bad faith.

#### 2. Rigorous testing – debate requires stasis to motivate research that develops third and fourth line responses – that’s key to politics and activism regardless of your personal beliefs – their interp explodes limits, makes the Aff conditional, and forces the Neg into concessionary ground.

### 1NC---World Systems

#### Neolib isn’t a monolithic root cause but pervasive---micropolitics disseminates post-Fordist productivity into remote terrains of lived experience to corrupt dissent.

Papadopoulos 8 (Dimitris, School of Social Science @Cardiff U, Leicester Reader in Sociology and Organisation. “In the ruins of representation: Identity, individuality, subjectification”, British Journal of Social Psychology, 47.1, ebsco//shree)

The turn to micropolitics and the dissolution of the foundationalist understandings of identity (either in its essentialist or discursive reductionist versions) enable political analyses of previously neglected and effaced domains of everyday life. But do micropolitics effectively challenge state regulation and open pathways for the emergence of a multiplicity of different modes of embodied subjectification? Or does embodied subjectification become a new mode of state regulated existence? The power of micropolitics is thought to lie in the fact that they bypass the reproduction of the state as an intact and paramount entity of power. Micropolitics harness everyday lived and embodied experience as a vital matter of political struggles which aim to reinvigorate civil society, that is, the struggles of associations of people which develop outside of state institutions (Warner, 2002). However, seen historically, since the 1980s micropolitics have increasingly become integral to the effective realization of neoliberal governance. This is because this mode of engagement is aligned with transformations which have occurred at the level of the state. The neoliberal state is not a monolithic container, rather it disseminates into the most remote terrains of everyday experience. The dismantling of welfare systems has accelerated, and finally consolidated, the state’s withdrawal from the traditional role of centralized organizer of society. However, the result has not been the disappearance of the state itself, rather we are witnessing the disappearance of the welfare state and the emergence of new one (Fairbrother & Rainnie, 2005; Jessop, 2002; Sassen, 1999). Social control is primarily performed through the colonization of previously regarded private areas of individual existence: the body, health, fashion and well-being, sexuality, your living-room. In this process, embodied subjectification and micropolitics have become necessary elements for the functioning of the neoliberal state. The neoliberal state needs, more than self-regulating individuals, networked actors who actively forge the structures necessary for the transformation from centralized state powers to disseminated modes of neoliberal regulation (Marazzi, 1998; Neilson & Rossiter, 2005; Papadopoulos, 2003; Stephenson, 2003). Hence, although they arose as an attempt to challenge the overly narrow focus on the state, micropolitics have played a vital role in shifting the historical function of the state from centralized control into a disseminated form of control which operates effectively in the terrain of social and cultural life. In this sense, both state- and micropolitics articulate their political agenda inside the terrain of the state and affirm its function and centrality in social life. This is the moment where embodied subjectification and the broader project of critical psychology amplify the production of affirmative subjectivity, a subjectivity which paradoxically solidifies state regulation by operating at its margins. However, the generation of affirmative subjectivity is more than a form of political regulation in contemporary North-Atlantic societies. It is also a productive force in the literal sense. The traditional apparatus for measuring and diagnosing individual differences was insufficient as a response to the social and economical transformations related to post-Fordist labour (Bowring, 2002; Gorz, 2004; Lazzarato, 2002; Moulier Boutang, 2003; Williams, 1994). This is because post-Fordism appropriates as productive resources precisely these forms of individual action and experience, which refer to the totality of individual subjectivity: relationality, emotions, memory, communication, creativity and primarily, the totality of the body. Critical psychology’s conceptualization captures the core tenet of the post-Fordist transformation in a magnificent way: embodied subjectification becomes the algorithm for the realization of the process of the ‘subjectivization of work’, a process which lies in the heart of post-Fordist productivity (Lohr & Nickel, 2005; Moldaschl & Voss, 2003; Scho¨nberger & Springer, 2003). Yet critical psychology neither traces possible ruptures in the post-Fordist arrangement nor explores everyday forms of exodus and disobedience (Moulier Boutang, 1998; Virno, 2004). In other words, the critical psychological view of subjectification can elucidate, or diagnose, the productive role of the psychology in the social earthquake which accompanied the post-Fordist reorganization of labour and everyday sociality in North-Atlantic societies (Gordo-Lo´pez & Pujol Tarre´s, 2004; Papadopoulos, 2004). However, critical psychology is unable to engage with the suppressed potentialities of post-Fordist social relations which could lead to forms of political engagement that question post-Fordism itself (Karakayali & Tsianos, 2005; Negri, 1999; Santos, 2001; Stephenson, 2004). The reason for this is, as I argued above, that embodied subjectification is the core productive form of today’s sociality. Embodied subjectification is not only a heuristic tool which enables social researchers to understand power relations in post-Fordist North-Atlantic societies, but also the very guarantor of what Weber (1978) calls ‘legitimate domination’. A form of domination which is actively and willingly performed differently by each individual and congeals a form of power, which, following Hannah Arendt (1970), emerges not as a means to dominate but by the very fact that people act together. Embodied subjectification (and its very theoreticization by governmentality studies) is a form of obedience to today’s configuration of power in North-Atlantic societies. In this sense, micropolitics and embodied subjectification constitute a form of affirmative subjectivity in neoliberal and post-Fordist conditions. In the last part of the paper, I will briefly discuss Jacques Rancie`re’s concept of politics as a means for interfering in the production of affirmative subjectivity (for a more broad discussion of this issue s. Stephenson & Papadopoulos, 2006).

#### The quest to reinvent our debate curriculum holds the promise of a new more democratic future. However, the only way forward is to nourish a radically collective imagination that challenges the biopolitics of neoliberalism. That must start with a rejection of their disdain for the state because a successful curriculum inquiry demands the reconstitution our democratic commons.

Bourassa 11—Professor of educational psychology & foundations at the University of North-Western Iowa and a PhD in Education, Culture, & Society at the University of Utah [Gregory N., “Rethinking the Curricular Imagination: Curriculum and Biopolitics in the Age of Neoliberalism,” *Curriculum Inquiry*, Vol. 41, Issue 1, p. 5-16, Jan 2011, Emory Libraries]

INTRODUCTION: CURRICULUM INQUIRY IN THE AGE OF NEOLIBERALISM

One of the more difficult and pressing challenges confronting curriculum inquiry today relates to the increasing enclosure and privatization of the public sphere. Public schools, often exalted and thought to be among the most resilient spaces of the common, are now incredibly fragile, on the brink of being fully besieged by the onslaught of neoliberalism ([De Lissovoy, 2008](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b12); [Saltman, 2007](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b48)). While this practice of enclosure is not necessarily new, as market forces have long been encroaching the spaces of public schooling ([Du Bois, 1918](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b17); [Dewey, 1930](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b16)), the emergence of neoliberalism in the last thirty years marks a particularly insidious turn. The novelty of neoliberalism resides not only in that it has become normalized and even celebrated, but also in that the far-reaching tentacles of neoliberalism assume pedagogical dimensions.[1](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#en1) At the same time, the unapologetic posturing of neoliberalism ([Giroux, 2009](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b27)) offers curriculum theorists the contours of a common target that has not always been so easily recognizable in attempts to chart the flows and logics of capital. From this, we might gather that the current configuration of neoliberalism, like that of public schooling, precariously occupies a liminal status between that of inordinate durability and immanent vulnerability.

Given the hubris and arrogance of neoliberalism, we are now better armored with the vocabularies and conceptual understandings needed to both defend and rethink the institution of public schooling in our current juncture. For curriculum inquiry, this means reclaiming, and more accurately, reinventing, the educational experience. As [William Pinar (2004](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b45)) notes:

In its interest in and commitment to the study of educational experience, curriculum theory is critical of contemporary school “reform.” Indeed, “educational experience” seems precisely what politicians do not want, as they insist we focus on test scores, the “bottom line.” By linking the curriculum to student performance on standardized examinations, politicians have, in effect, taken control of what is to be taught: the curriculum. Examination-driven curricula demote teachers from scholars and intellectuals to technicians in service to the state. The cultivation of self-reflexive, interdisciplinary erudition and intellectuality disappears. Rationalized as “accountability,” political socialization replaces education. (pp. 2–3)

Although Pinar is highlighting some of the most saliently corrosive school practices, his stress on the enclosure of the educational experience does not translate into acquiescence to market forces. In fact, it could be argued that the circumstances for absolute democracy have never been more possible ([Hardt & Negri, 2004](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b33)).[2](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#en2) In the face of perpetual reform, high-stakes testing, mechanical pedagogy, scripted curricula, and punitive disciplinary practices, curriculum inquiry is immediately thrust into a limit-situation in which a new horizon of possibilities is unveiled ([Freire, 2000](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b22)). In other words, these realities are not “the impassable boundaries where possibilities end, but the real boundaries where all possibilities begin” (Alvaro Vieira Pinto, quoted in [Freire, 2000](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b22), p. 99). With this, the task of curriculum inquiry is to collectively imagine fields of possibility ([Appadurai, 1996](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b3)), working from the occupied, yet generative, confines of a “cramped space” ([Deleuze & Guattari, 1986](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b13), p. 17). At the same time, such calls for an unleashed curricular imagination must be tempered with the humility of a diligent yet playful social imagination that recognizes that problems are always beginning anew and altering in both form and appearance ([de Certeau, 1984](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b11)). Thus in curriculum inquiry's quest to reinvent public schooling as a beacon of possibility and promise for a new democratic future, the only way to proceed is to nourish a radically collective imagination and embrace the inextinguishable spirit of struggle ([Dewey, 1927](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b15); [Giroux, Penna, & Pinar, 1981](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b29); [Pinar, 2004](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b45)).

SKETCHING A FRAMEWORK OF BIOPOLITICS

With the task of unfurling the curricular imagination I shall explore the recent writings of two educational theorists, Henry Giroux and Tyson Lewis, in hope of uncovering the potential insights they may provide for the field of curriculum inquiry. Of primary importance for an engagement with these writings is a theoretical framework of biopower and biopolitics which Giroux and Lewis both employ. In The History of Sexuality, and in his lectures at the College of France in spring 1976, [Michel Foucault (1990, 2003](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b20)) characterized a new regime of power. To describe a more complex account of contemporary power configurations that in many ways exceed and even bridge the regimes of sovereignty and disciplinary force, Foucault outlined the concept of biopower. Traditionally the power of the sovereign has been thought to be implicated within a juridical and contractual model of dominance that is marked by the capacity to take life, while disciplinary power has been characterized by the effective organization and discipline of the soul ([Foucault, 1977](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b19)). Whereas previous disciplinary powers aimed for the control of individuals at the level of the body, this new nondisciplinary form of power—biopower—aims to control the biological developments of life not through discipline but through processes of regularization and sites of equilibrium. In other words, whereas disciplinary power acts on individual bodies through training, surveillance and forms of punishment, biopower acts on “man-as-species,” achieving control over living beings, relations, and domains of the (re)production of life ([Foucault, 2003](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b21), p. 243). Biopower, then, intervenes in all social, cultural, economic, and environmental aspects of life.

Despite its orientation as a technology of rule or Power (as in potere and pouvoir)[3](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#en3) and its continuing reliance on sovereign force, biopower attempts to conceal these modalities as it purports to be primarily concerned with the (re)production and protection of life forms. In [Foucault's (2003](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b21)) account, biopower appears as a technology of security—not at the level of the individual, but of species—that endeavors to establish an equilibrium or homeostasis. As an apparatus of security, biopower shields those it protects—the “well born” or “Eugenia,” according to [Antonio Negri (2008](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b44))—from internal and external threats, or inferior species that may contaminate, so to speak, the dominant species (p. 193). Accordingly, biopower is invested in the overall health and security of the population and achieves its aim of homeostasis through techniques of regularization and invariably mechanisms of exclusion and containment. In this vein, biopower engages in subtle forms of eugenics and social engineering in the name of biological security.

To put it boldly, biopower attempts to mediate, control, capture, and administer all aspects of life. It is a power that becomes embedded, dispersed, and regularized throughout society and its populations. Biopolitics, then, is essentially the political struggle over life and death, and as we will see in the writings of Giroux and Lewis, the struggle to produce certain forms of life. While [Giorgio Agamben (1998](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b1)) along with [Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000, 2004, 2009](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b32)) are the most prominent writers exploring biopolitics in the wake of Foucault, their respective readings are very different. Whereas Agamben posits a negative biopolitics that takes on the form of a thanatopolitics predisposed toward certain forms of death, Hardt and Negri embrace an affirmative view of biopolitics that is oriented toward the production of social and political forms of life ([Esposito, 2008](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b18)). Picking up on these intonations, the writings of [Giroux (2009](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b27)), and similarly those of [Lewis (2007, 2008, 2009a, 2009b](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b37)), point curriculum theorists to two very important questions. [Giroux (2009](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b27)) asks whether public schooling is facilitating democracy and accompanying forms of life or surrendering to a biopolitics of neoliberalism that renders disposable those populations marginalized by race and class. As for [Lewis (2009b](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b40)), readers are pushed to consider whether we can imagine and embrace a new theory of affirmative biopolitics and education conducive to collective political life, or succumb to necroschooling, “a form of education that is more concerned with abandonment than with social investment, protection, etc.” (p. 33). The framing of these questions are not only biopolitical in nature, but they strike at the very heart of curriculum inquiry and the task of reinventing the educational experience ([Pinar, 2004](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b45)).

In my engagement with Giroux and Lewis, I shall suggest that biopolitics warrants the attention of curriculum inquiry in at least two significant ways: it not only offers a viable template for understanding the convergence of neoliberalism with the logics of White supremacy ([Bonilla-Silva, 2001](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b7)) and a war on the poor, but it also calls into question the very institution of schooling and thus the efficacy and integrity of reform. The former is an essential diagnostic tool for registering the relationships between schooling and the broader sites of culture, politics, and economics ([Apple, 1979](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b4); [Freire, 2000](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b22)), while the latter represents the praxis and unfolding of a “generative theme” that will open possibilities to “surmount the limit-situations” confronting curriculum inquiry ([Freire, 2000](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b22), p. 103). Hence a focus on biopolitics pushes the curricular imagination in productive ways, offering a new orientation to expand and imagine curriculum in a new key ([Pinar & Irwin, 2005](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b46)).

In what follows I shall first focus on [Giroux's (2009](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b27)) Youth in a Suspect Society: Democracy or Disposability? before engaging some of the writings of Lewis. By way of conclusion, I will offer an analysis that attempts to bridge their projects and further draw out the implications for curriculum inquiry.

DEMOCRACY OR DISPOSABILITY?

In addition to providing significant contributions to the field of curriculum theory, the writings of [Henry Giroux (1981a](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b25); [Giroux & Arnowitz, 1993](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b28); [Giroux, Penna, & Pinar, 1981](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b29); [Giroux & Purpel, 1983](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b30)) have always posed grave challenges to the ways in which we conceptualize the curricular relations between power and knowledge, social contexts, and school practices. As such, a serious examination of [Giroux's (1981b](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b26)) work leads us to approach curriculum with the recognition that it is inextricably bound to broader social contexts of cultural and political struggle. For Giroux, such contexts are never reduced, abstracted, or divorced from an ever-complex array of school practices that materially impact students on a daily basis. Always charting the domains of public pedagogy, Giroux's writings offer curriculum theorists extraordinary insights into how contestations of power shape and organize not only official school curricula or hidden curricula, but all aspects of social life ([Giroux & Arnowitz, 1993](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b28)). And now, perhaps more than ever, the writings of Giroux summon the curricular imagination to respond to a unique constellation of challenges that threaten to foreclose the educational experience along with the remaining possibilities for a democratic future.

Youth in a Suspect Society marks a continuation of Giroux's recent interests in the resurgence of authoritarianism, market-based logics of disposability, and a biopolitics of neoliberalism. The convergence of these concepts, for Giroux, is accompanied by a fundamental shift from an imperfect social state to a ruthless market state. This shift, from “state sovereignty” to “market sovereignty” is characterized by a disinvestment in the public sphere. In this configuration, anything pertaining to the public is not only neglected but also met with great disdain. As an economic logic, neoliberalism invades the public sphere, invalidating and enclosing that which cannot be filtered through a market rationality. Here, neoliberalism meets biopolitics in that politics distances itself from social governance—withdrawing from a commitment to protect its citizens—and increasingly resorts to governing populations through the economic reign of the market. In this cruel landscape that Giroux calls the biopolitics of neoliberalism, the social state ceases to exist only to be replaced by a corporate state that is intent on warding off democratic sensibilities and enclosing the few spheres of the public that remain.

Giroux's conceptual mapping of a biopolitics of neoliberalism contains yet another important element. Excluded from social and political life, those populations marginalized by class and race are reduced from the status of citizens to waste, or in [Agamben's (1998](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b1)) terms, from bios (social and political life) to zoē (life without quality). Rendered disposable under a biopolitics of neoliberalism, marginalized populations are vulnerable to Agamben's formulation of biopolitics as thanatopolitics. Giroux, rightfully taking Agamben's biopolitics seriously in this instance, draws here from [Achille Mbembe (2003](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b42)), who argues that “vast populations are subject to conditions of life conferring upon them the status of living dead” (p. 40). In short, a neoliberal biopolitics of disposability ushers in forms of social death, rendering populations expendable, without support, protection, or compassion. In Giroux's account, such a biopolitical order abandons populations under the guise that they represent the refuse of a neoliberal economic regime. This epitomizes, for Giroux, a complete violation of ethical responsibility and obligation to youth and the democratic future to come.

With the breaking of the social contract, in the U.S. context, the state is transformed from a “weakened welfare state into an increasingly powerful racialized warfare state” ([Giroux, 2009](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b27), p. 71). Embedded within this shift, what emerges is a powerful concoction of a racial state, a punishing state, and a carceral state, in which disposable populations constitute a threat that must be contained. Hence, prisons become the primary disciplinary apparatuses that regulate and govern disposable populations. According to [Giroux (2009](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b27)), “The institution of the prison is at the ideological center of the biopolitics of the punishing state dutifully inscribing its presence into the political and cultural landscape of everyday life” (p. 83). In this important passage, we can begin to see how the site of schooling comes to function as an appendage for the carceral state. In fact, as [Giroux (2009](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b27)) asserts, a neoliberal biopolitics of disposability is able to forcefully “collapse the distinctions between crime and social problems, prison and school, and race and disposability, while constructing spaces that subject minority youth and others rendered redundant to a form of punitive control, if not social death” (p. 80). As a result of this blurring of boundaries, apartheid schools—those schools “in which 99 to 100 percent of students are nonwhite” ([Kozol, 2005](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b36), p. 18)—come to closely resemble prisons, or at the very least, enclaves of intellectual, social and political containment ([De Lissovoy, 2008](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b12); [Devine 1996](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b14); [Giroux, 2009](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b27)). Too often, such sites jettison the educational lives and futures of those students within their purview.

It is here where the real insight of Giroux's text takes shape and productively aggravates the curricular imagination by exposing the broken promises of public schooling. While many have similarly pointed to the eroding investment in the futures of working-class youth of color ([Kozol, 2005](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b36); [Valenzuela, 1999](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b51)), Giroux is able to outline the contours of a viable theory—a neoliberal biopolitics of disposability—that provides a new analytic for understanding the form and content of teacher education in relation to broader social patterns. There are at least two points of interest here worth noting. First, [Foucault (2003](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b21)) insisted that modern racism is a “mechanism that allows biopower to work. So racism is bound up with the workings of a State that is obliged to use race, the elimination of races and the purification of the race, to exercise its sovereign power” (p. 258). Despite this, few theorists focusing on biopolitics endeavor to interrogate how “racism justifies the death-function in the economy of biopower” ([Foucault, 2003](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b21), p. 258). Youth in a Suspect Society not only attempts to make explicit the links between biopower and schooling, but it achieves in beginning to demonstrate how the warehousing of Black and Brown children in lockdown schools—along with the production of educational and social death—performs a principle function of biopower. The importance of making these conceptual links between biopower and racial domination, and subsequently Giroux's connection of this theory to material outcomes cannot be understated.

Second, employing the theory of a neoliberal biopolitics of disposability, Giroux highlights the broken promises of public schooling in terms that refocus what is at stake for curriculum inquiry. Beyond the myopic rhetoric of accountability and standards, it is absolute democracy ([Dewey, 1927](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b15); [Hardt & Negri, 2004](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b33)) and its unfolding futurity that is in jeopardy. Put differently, a biopolitical reading of curriculum insists that the production and reproduction of certain forms of life are at the very center of the educational experience. Thus, no longer can prevailing conceptions of curriculum fail to locate the ideological underpinnings of school practices, allowing the relationship between schooling and economic, political, and cultural imperatives to remain veiled. In other words, curriculum inquiry must strive to locate and disrupt the commensurability between these prevailing imperatives, their broader political projects and the mandates they impose on curriculum. With the aid of Giroux's biopolitical framework, the curricular imagination must conceive of the educational experience not as a formula to be consumed or constructed for calculable instrumentality, but rather as a vital resource for galvanizing a robust social imagination capable of collectively negotiating and perpetually reconstructing democratic life ([Dewey, 1927](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-873X.2010.00528.x/full#b15)). The writings of Tyson Lewis, which I will now turn to, are especially crucial for this task.

CONFRONTING NECROSCHOOLING: TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF BIOPOLITICAL SCHOOLING

In what might initially strike some as a dizzying array of scholarship—ranging from aesthetics to utopian theories of education—the vast intellectual production of Tyson Lewis, I argue, is indispensable for any project of rethinking the educational experience. Lewis is, in my mind, the central figure writing about biopolitics and schooling today. His gallant efforts to piece together the biopolitical writings of Foucault, Agamben, and Hardt and Negri have led him to rethink the strengths and inadequacies of educational thinkers such as John Dewey, Paulo Freire, and Ivan Illich. More importantly, Lewis’s writings exemplify a commitment to reimagining the space of the school in a biopolitical context. For example, whereas Giroux’s (2009) text serves predominately as a diagnostic tool for curriculum inquiry, the writings of Lewis (2007) propel the curricular imagination by not only confronting the logics of modern schooling, but by imaginatively mapping an alternative theory of biopolitical education. I will confine my analysis to three of Lewis’s recent essays, all of which explore biopolitics and schooling, and as I shall suggest, bear a particular importance for curriculum inquiry.

The first essay, “Defining the Political Ontology of the Classroom: Toward a Multitudinous Education” (Lewis, 2008), critiques Hardt and Negri’s (2004) theorizing of the multitude—an internally different and insurgent global force that opposes the sovereignty of the new global form of rule, Empire. Lewis rightfully points out that Hardt and Negri not only utterly lack theory of education, but they completely fail to acknowledge youth as agents of the multitude. The major shortcomings of this model offer, for Lewis, an opening to imagine a theory of education that retains the spirit of the multitude and its oppositional dimensions. Highlighting¶ the various aims of modern schooling in its corrupt capacity as a people-building project, Lewis (2008) endeavors to reconceptualize schools as spaces of biopolitical production in which subjectivities oriented toward “democracy in its ontological form” are cultivated (pp. 255–256). Rather than administering populations, such schools would be sites of democratic engagement and struggle.

Such a view of schooling is, for the most part, quite compatible with Pinar’s (2004) take on the educational experience. Both of their formulations are articulated against the backdrop of neoliberalism’s enclosure of the form and contleggent of schooling. To this, Lewis (2008) calls for a mode of schooling for the multitude that “ceases to be predetermined by standards (no¶ matter how flexible) and becomes a flexible, open-ended tool responsive to the needs and¶ immediate interests of the multitude to increase the general intellect and the power to act” (p. 256). This way of thinking about biopolitics and curriculum as a temporal and spatial act of unfolding shifts the focus of schools in such a way that the “experiences of children are not to be alienated from the curriculum but rather integrated into the classroom through shared, biopolitical group work that involves the reconstitution of the common” (p. 257). While the project of reinventing common spaces in schools is essential, such a task also encounters major obstacles in a neoliberal context. The problem arises in that the economic and political imperatives of neoliberalism reduce spaces of cooperation and collectivity to the “colonial category of wastelands,” given that such spaces do not promote capitalism (Shiva, 2005, p. 25). In this sense, such spaces are simultaneously rendered discardable and threatening. There is a wild, overflowing, and inexhaustible power in the common (Hardt & Negri, 2009), and capital’s preoccupation with enclosing “wastelands” is a testament to this power. Clearly, curriculum inquiry must struggle with the biopolitical task of reinventing and nurturing the common, which in turn produces democratic subjectivities. Pg. 5-11

#### Neolib commoditizes life, ensures inequality and eco-crisis

Harvey 5 (David, FBA is the Distinguished Professor of Anthropology and Geography @ the Graduate Center of the City Univ. of New York, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, pgs 165-171//shree)

To presume that markets and market signals can best determine all allocative decisions is to presume that everything can in principle be treated as a commodity. Commodification presumes the existence of property rights over processes, things, and social relations, that a price can be put on them, and that they can be traded subject to legal contract. The market is presumed to work as an appropriate guide––an ethic––for all human action. In practice, of course, every society sets some bounds on where commodification begins and ends. Where the boundaries lie is a matter of contention. Certain drugs are deemed illegal. The buying and selling of sexual favours is outlawed in most US states, though elsewhere it may be legalized, decriminalized, and even state-regulated as an industry. Pornography is broadly protected as a form of free speech under US law although here, too, there are certain forms (mainly concerning children) that are considered beyond the pale. In the US, conscience and honour are supposedly not for sale, and there exists a curious penchant to pursue ‘corruption’ as if it is easily distinguishable from the normal practices of influence-peddling and making money in the marketplace. The commodification of sexuality, culture, history, heritage; of nature as spectacle or as rest cure; the extraction of monopoly rents from originality, authenticity, and uniqueness (of works or art, for example)––these all amount to putting a price on things that were never actually produced as commodities.17 There is often disagreement as to the appropriate- ness of commodification (of religious events and symbols, for example) or of who should exercise the property rights and derive the rents (over access to Aztec ruins or marketing of Aboriginal art, for example).¶ Neoliberalization has unquestionably rolled back the bounds of commodification and greatly extended the reach of legal contracts. It typically celebrates (as does much of postmodern theory) ephemerality and the short-term contract––marriage, for example, is understood as a short-term contractual arrangement rather than as a sacred and unbreakable bond. The divide between neoliberals and neoconservatives partially reflects a difference as to where the lines are drawn. The neoconservatives typically blame ‘liberals’, ‘Hollywood’, or even ‘postmodernists’ for what they see as the dissolution and immorality of the social order, rather than the corporate capitalists (like Rupert Murdoch) who actually do most of the damage by foisting all manner of sexually charged if not salacious material upon the world and who continually flaunt their pervasive preference for short-term over long-term commitments in their endless pursuit of profit.¶ But there are far more serious issues here than merely trying to protect some treasured object, some particular ritual or a preferred corner of social life from the monetary calculus and the short-term contract. For at the heart of liberal and neoliberal theory lies the necessity of constructing coherent markets for land, labour, and money, and these, as Karl Polanyi pointed out, ‘are obviously not commodities . . . the commodity description of labour, land, and money is entirely fictitious’. While capitalism cannot function without such fictions, it does untold damage if it fails to acknowledge the complex realities behind them. Polanyi, in one of his more famous passages, puts it this way:¶ To allow the market mechanism to be sole director of the fate of human beings and their natural environment, indeed, even of the amount and use of purchasing power, would result in the demolition of society. For the alleged commodity ‘labour power’ cannot be shoved about, used indiscriminately, or even left unused, without affecting also the human individual who happens to be the bearer of this peculiar commodity. In disposing of man’s labour power the system would, incidentally, dispose of the physical, psychological, and moral entity ‘man’ attached to that tag. Robbed of the protective covering of cultural institutions, human beings would perish from the effects of social exposure; they would die as victims of acute social dislocation through vice, perversion, crime and starvation. Nature would be reduced to its elements, neighborhoods and landscapes defiled, rivers polluted, military safety jeopardized, the power to produce food and raw materials destroyed. Finally, the market administration of purchasing power would periodically liquidate business enterprise, for shortages and surfeits of money would prove as disastrous to business as floods and droughts in primitive society.18¶ The damage wrought through the ‘floods and droughts’ of fictitious capitals within the global credit system, be it in Indonesia, Argentina, Mexico, or even within the US, testifies all too well to Polanyi’s final point. But his theses on labour and land deserve further elaboration.¶ Individuals enter the labour market as persons of character, as individuals embedded in networks of social relations and socialized in various ways, as physical beings identifiable by certain characteristics (such as phenotype and gender), as individuals who have accumulated various skills (sometimes referred to as ‘human cap- ital’) and tastes (sometime referred to as ‘cultural capital’), and as living beings endowed with dreams, desires, ambitions, hopes, doubts, and fears. For capitalists, however, such individuals are a mere factor of production, though not an undifferentiated factor since employers require labour of certain qualities, such as physical strength, skills, flexibility, docility, and the like, appropriate to cer- tain tasks. Workers are hired on contract, and in the neoliberal scheme of things short-term contracts are preferred in order to maximize flexibility. Employers have historically used differentiations within the labour pool to divide and rule. Segmented labour markets then arise and distinctions of race, ethnicity, gen- der, and religion are frequently used, blatantly or covertly, in ways that redound to the employers’ advantage. Conversely, workers may use the social networks in which they are embedded to gain privileged access to certain lines of employment. They typically seek to monopolize skills and, through collective action and the creation of appropriate institutions, seek to regulate the labour market to protect their interests. In this they are merely construct- ing that ‘protective covering of cultural institutions’ of which Polanyi speaks.¶ Neoliberalization seeks to strip away the protective coverings that embedded liberalism allowed and occasionally nurtured. The general attack against labour has been two-pronged. The powers of trade unions and other working-class institutions are curbed or dismantled within a particular state (by violence if necessary). Flexible labour markets are established. State withdrawal from social welfare provision and technologically induced shifts in job structures that render large segments of the labour force redun- dant complete the domination of capital over labour in the market- place. The individualized and relatively powerless worker then confronts a labour market in which only short-term contracts are offered on a customized basis. Security of tenure becomes a thing of the past (Thatcher abolished it in universities, for example). A ‘personal responsibility system’ (how apt Deng’s language was!) is substituted for social protections (pensions, health care, protec- tions against injury) that were formerly an obligation of employers and the state. Individuals buy products in the markets that sell social protections instead. Individual security is therefore a matter of individual choice tied to the affordability of financial products embedded in risky financial markets.¶ The second prong of attack entails transformations in the spa- tial and temporal co-ordinates of the labour market. While too much can be made of the ‘race to the bottom’ to find the cheapest and most docile labour supplies, the geographical mobility of capital permits it to dominate a global labour force whose own geographical mobility is constrained. Captive labour forces abound because immigration is restricted. These barriers can be evaded only by illegal immigration (which creates an easily exploitable labour force) or through short-term contracts that permit, for example, Mexican labourers to work in Californian agribusiness only to be shamelessly shipped back to Mexico when they get sick and even die from the pesticides to which they are exposed.¶ Under neoliberalization, the figure of ‘the disposable worker’ emerges as prototypical upon the world stage.19 Accounts of the appalling conditions of labour and the despotic conditions under which labourers work in the sweatshops of the world abound. In China, the conditions under which migrant young women from rural areas work are nothing short of appalling: ‘unbearably long hours, substandard food, cramped dorms, sadistic managers who beat and sexually abuse them, and pay that arrives months late, or sometimes not at all’.20 In Indonesia, two young women recounted their experiences working for a Singapore-based Levi-Strauss subcontractor as follows:¶ We are regularly insulted, as a matter of course. When the boss gets angry he calls the women dogs, pigs, sluts, all of which we have to endure patiently without reacting. We work officially from seven in the morning until three (salary less than $2 a day), but there is often compulsory overtime, sometimes––especially if there is an urgent order to be delivered––until nine. However tired we are, we are not allowed to go home. We may get an extra 200 rupiah (10 US cents) . . . We go on foot to the factory from where we live. Inside it is very hot. The building has a metal roof, and there is not much space for all the workers. It is very cramped. There are over 200 people working there, mostly women, but there is only one toilet for the whole factory . . . when we come home from work, we have no energy left to do anything but eat and sleep . . .21¶ Similar tales come from the Mexican maquila factories, the Taiwanese- and Korean-operated manufacturing plants in Honduras, South Africa, Malaysia, and Thailand. The health haz- ards, the exposure to a wide range of toxic substances, and death on the job pass by unregulated and unremarked. In Shanghai, the Taiwanese businessman who ran a textile warehouse ‘in which 61 workers, locked in the building, died in a fire’ received a ‘lenient’ two-year suspended sentence because he had ‘showed repentance’ and ‘cooperated in the aftermath of the fire’.22¶ Women, for the most part, and sometimes children, bear the brunt of this sort of degrading, debilitating, and dangerous toil.23 The social consequences of neoliberalization are in fact extreme. Accumulation by dispossession typically undermines whatever powers women may have had within household production/ marketing systems and within traditional social structures and relocates everything in male-dominated commodity and credit markets. The paths of women’s liberation from traditional patri- archal controls in developing countries lie either through degrad- ing factory labour or through trading on sexuality, which varies from respectable work as hostesses and waitresses to the sex trade (one of the most lucrative of all contemporary industries in which a good deal of slavery is involved). The loss of social protec- tions in advanced capitalist countries has had particularly negative effects on lower-class women, and in many of the ex-communist countries of the Soviet bloc the loss of women’s rights through neoliberalization has been nothing short of catastrophic.¶ So how, then, do disposable workers––women in particular–– survive both socially and affectively in a world of flexible labour markets and short-term contracts, chronic job insecurities, lost social protections, and often debilitating labour, amongst the wreckage of collective institutions that once gave them a modicum of dignity and support? For some the increased flexibility in labour markets is a boon, and even when it does not lead to material gains the simple right to change jobs relatively easily and free of the traditional social constraints of patriarchy and family has intangible benefits. For those who successfully negotiate the labour market there are seemingly abundant rewards in the world of a capitalist consumer culture. Unfortunately, that culture, however spectacular, glamorous, and beguiling, perpetually plays with desires without ever conferring satisfactions beyond the limited identity of the shopping mall and the anxieties of status by way of good looks (in the case of women) or of material possessions. ‘I shop therefore I am’ and possessive individualism together con- struct a world of pseudo-satisfactions that is superficially exciting but hollow at its core. But for those who have lost their jobs or who have never managed to move out of the extensive informal economies that now provide a parlous refuge for most of the world’s disposable work- ers, the story is entirely different. With some 2 billion people condemned to live on less than $2 a day, the taunting world of capitalist consumer culture, the huge bonuses earned in financial services, and the self-congratulatory polemics as to the emancipa- tory potential of neoliberalization, privatization, and personal responsibility must seem like a cruel joke. From impoverished rural China to the affluent US, the loss of health-care protections and the increasing imposition of all manner of user fees adds considerably to the financial burdens of the poor.24

#### Vote neg for a historical materialist world-systems approach.

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Today the terms “world economy”, “world market”, and “globalization” are commonplace, appearing in the sound-bites of politicians, media commentators, and unemployed workers alike. But few know that the most important source for these phrases lies with work started by sociologists in the early Seventies. At a time when the mainstream assumption of accepted social, political, and economic science held that the “wealth of nations” reflected mainly on the cultural developments within those nations, a growing group of social scientists recognized that national “development” could be best understood as the complex outcome of local interactions with an aggressively expanding Europe-centered “world-system” (Wallerstein 1974; Frank 1978).1 Not only did these scientists perceive the global nature of economic networks 20 years before they entered popular discourse, but they also saw that many of these networks extend back at least 600 years. Over this time, the peoples of the globe became linked into one integrated unit: the modern world-system. Now, 20 years on, social scientists working in the area are trying to understand the history and evolution of the whole system, as well as how local, national and regional entities have been integrated into it. This current research has required broadening our perspective to include deeper temporal and larger spatial frameworks. For example, some recent research has compared the modern Europe-centered world-system of the last six hundred years with earlier, smaller intersocietal networks that have existed for millennia (Frank and Gills 1993; Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997). Other work uses the knowledge of cycles and trends that has grown out of world-systems research to anticipate likely future events with a precision impossible before the advent of the theory. This is still a new field and much remains to be done, but enough has already been achieved to provide a valuable understanding of the phenomenon of globalization. The discourse about globalization has emerged mainly in the last decade. The term means many different things, and there are many reasons for its emergence as a popular concept. The usage of this term generally implies that a recent change (within the last decade or two) has occurred in technology and in the size of the arena of economic competition. The general idea is that information technology has created a context in which the global market, rather than separate national markets, is the relevant arena for economic competition. It then follows that economic competitiveness needs to be assessed in the global context, rather than in a national or local context. These notions have been used to justify the adoption of new practices by firms and governments all over the world and these developments have altered the political balances among states, firms, unions and other interest groups. The first task is to put this development into historical context. The world-systems perspective has shown that intersocietal geopolitics and geoeconomics has been the relevant arena of competition for national-states, firms and classes for hundreds of years. The degree of international connectedness of economic and political/military networks was already important in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The first “transnational corpora-tions” (TNCs) were the great chartered companies of the seventeenth century. They organized both production and exchange on an intercontinental scale. The rise and fall of hegemonic core powers, which continues today with the relative decline of the United States hegemony, was already in full operation in the seventeenth century rise and fall of Dutch hegemony (see Arrighi 1994; Modelski and Thompson 1996; Taylor 1996). The capitalist world-economy has experienced cyclical processes and secular trends for hundreds of years (Chase-Dunn 1998:Chapter 2). The cyclical processes include the rise and fall of hegemons, the Kondratieff wave (a forty to sixty year business cycle)2 , a cycle of warfare among core states (Goldstein 1988), and cycles of colonization and decolonization (Bergesen and Schoenberg 1980). The world-system has also experienced several secular trends including a long-term proletarianization of the world work force, growing concentration of capital into larger and larger firms, increasing internationalization of capital investment and of trade, and accelerating internationalization of political structures. In this perspective, globalization is a long-term upward trend of political and economic change that is affected by cyclical processes. The most recent technological changes, and the expansions of international trade and investment, are part of these long-run changes. One question is exactly how the most recent changes compare with the long-run trends? And what are the important continuities as well as the qualitative differences that accompany these changes? These are the questions that I propose to explore. types of globalization There are at least five different dimensions of globalization that need to be distinguished. There are also several misunderstandings and misinterpretations that need to be clarified. Let us evaluate five different meanings of globalization: (1) Common ecological constraints This aspect of globalization involves global threats due to our fragile ecosystem and the globalization of ecological risks. Anthropogenic causes of ecological degradation have long operated, and these in turn have affected human social evolution (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997). But ecological degradation has only recently begun to operate on a global scale. This fact creates a set of systemic constraints that require global collective action. (2) Cultural globalization This aspect of globalization relates to the diffusion of two sets of cultural phenomena: • the proliferation of individualized values, originally of Western origin, to ever larger parts of the world population. These values are expressed in social constitutions that recognize individual rights and identities and transnational and international efforts to protect “human rights.” • the adoption of originally Western institutional practices. Bureaucratic organization and rationality, belief in a law-like natural universe, the values of economic efficiency and political democracy have been spreading throughout the world since they were propagated in the European Enlightenment (Meyer 1996; Markoff 1996). Whereas some of the discussions of the world polity assume that cultural components have been a central aspect of the modern world-system from the start (e.g. Meyer 1989; Mann 1986), I emphasize the comparatively non-normative nature of the modern world-system (Chase-Dunn 1998: Chapter 5). But I acknowledge the growing salience of cultural consensus in the last 100 years. Whereas the modern world-system has always been, and is still, multicultural, the growing influence and acceptance of Western values of rationality, individualism, equality, and efficiency is an important trend of the twentieth century. (3) Globalization of communication Another meaning of globalization is connected with the new era of information technology. Anthony Giddens(1996) insists that social space comes to acquire new qualities with generalized electronic communications, albeit only in the networked parts of the world. In terms of accessibility, cost and velocity, the hitherto more local political and geographic parameters that structured social relationships are greatly expanded. One may well argue that time-space compression (Harvey 1989) by new information technologies is simply an extension and acceleration of the very long-term trend toward technological development over the last ten millenia (Chase-Dunn 1994). Yet, the rapid decrease in the cost of communications may have qualitatively altered the relationship between states and consciousness and this may be an important basis for the formation of a much stronger global civil society. Global communication facilities have the power to move things visible and invisible from one part of the globe to another whether any nation-state likes it or not. This applies not only to economic exchange, but also to ideas, and these new networks of communication can create new political groups and alignments. How, and to what extent, will this undermine the power of states to structure social relationships? (4) Economic globalization Economic globalization means globe-spanning economic relationships. The interrelationships of markets, finance, goods and services, and the networks created by transnational corporations are the most important manifestations of this. Though the capitalist world-system has been international in essence for centuries, the extent and degree of trade and investment globalization has increased greatly in recent decades. Economic globalization has been accelerated by what information technology has done to the movement of money. It is commonly claimed that the market’s ability to shift money from one part of the globe to another by the push of a button has changed the rules of policy-making, putting economic decisions much more at the mercy of market forces than before. The world-system has undergone major waves of economic globalization before, especially in the last decades of the the nineteenth century. One important question is whether or not the most recent wave has actually integrated the world to a qualitatively greater extent that it was integrated during the former wave. All the breathy discussions of global capitalism and global society assume that this is the case, but careful comparative research indicates that this is not so (see below and Chase-Dunn, Kawano and Brewer 2000). (5) Political globalization Political globalization consists of the institutionalization of international political structures. The Europe-centered world-system has been primarily constituted as an interstate system—a system of conflicting and allying states and empires. Earlier world-systems, in which accumulation was mainly accomplished by means of institutionalized coercive power, experienced an oscillation between multicentric interstate systems and core-wide world empires in which a single “universal” state conquered all or most of the core states in a region. The Europe-centered system has also experienced a cyclical alternation between political centralization and decentralization, but this has taken the form of the rise and fall of hegemonic core states that do not conquer the other core states. Hence the modern world-system has remained multicentric in the core, and this is due mainly to the shift toward a form of accumulation based more on the production and profitable sale of commodities—capitalism. The hegemons have been the most thoroughly capitalist states and they have preferred to follow a strategy of controlling trade and access to raw material imports from the periphery rather than conquering other core states to extract tribute or taxes. Power competition in an interstate system does not require much in the way of cross-state cultural consensus to operate systemically. But since the early nineteenth century the European interstate system has been developing both an increasingly consensual international normative order and a set of international political structures that regulate all sorts of interaction. This phenomenon has been termed “global governance” by Craig Murphy (1994) and others. It refers to the growth of both specialized and general international organizations. The general organizations that have emerged are the Concert of Europe, the League of Nations and the United Nations. The sequence of these “proto-world-states” constitutes a process of institution-building, but unlike earlier “universal states” this one is slowly emerging by means of condominium among core states rather than conquest. This is the trend of political globalization. It is yet a weak, but persistent, concentration of sovereignty in international institutions. If it continues it will eventuate in a single global state that could effectively outlaw warfare and enforce its illegality. The important empirical question, analogous to the discussion of economic globalization above, is the relative balance of power between international and global political organizations vis a vis national states. We assume this to be an upward trend, but like economic globalization it probably is also a cycle. Measuring Economic Globalization The brief discussion above of economic globalization implies that it is a long-run upward trend. The idea is that international economic competition as well as geopolitical competition were already important in the fourteenth century and that they became increasingly important as more and more international trade and international investment occurred. In its simplest form this would posit a linear upward trend of economic globalization. An extreme alternative hypothesis about economic globalization would posit a completely unintegrated world composed of autarchic national economies until some point (perhaps in the last few decades) at which a completely global market for commodities and capital suddenly emerged. Let us examine data that can tell us more about the temporal emergence of economic globalization. There are potentially a large number of different indicators of economic globalization and they may or may not exhibit similar patterns with respect to change over time. Trade globalization can be operationalized as the proportion of all world production that crosses international boundaries. Investment globalization would be the proportion of all invested capital in the world that is owned by non-nationals (i.e. “foreigners”). And we could also investigate the degree of economic integration of countries by determining the extent to which national economic growth rates are correlated across countries. 3 It would be ideal to have these measures over several centuries, but comparable fi gures are not available before the nineteenth century, and indeed even these are sparse and probably unrepresentative of the whole system until well into the twentieth century. Nevertheless we can learn some important things by examining those comparable data that are available. Figure 1 shows trade and investment globalization. Trade globalization is the ratio of estimated total world exports (the sum of the value of exports of all countries) divided by an estimate of total world product (the sum of all the national GDPs). Investment globalization is the total book value of all foreign direct investment divided by the total world product. The trade globalization figures show the hypothesized upward trend as well as a downturn that occurred between 1929 and 1950. Note that the time scale in Figure 1 is distorted by the paucity of data before 1950. It is possible that important changes in trade globalization are not visible in this series because of the wide temporal gaps in the data. Indeed a more recent study has shown that this is the case. There was a shorter and less well-defined wave of trade globalization from 1900 to 1929 (Chase-Dunn, Kawano and Brewer 2000). Figure 1 also shows that the trade indicator differs in some ways from the investment indicator. Investment globalization was higher (or as high) in 1913 as it was in 1991, while trade globalization was considerably lower in 1913 than it was in 1992. We have fewer time points for the investment data, so we cannot tell for sure about the shape of the changes that took place, but these two series imply that different indicators of economic globalization may show somewhat different trajectories. More research needs to be done on investment globalization to determine its exact trajectory and for comparison with trade globalization and other world-system cycles and trends. A third indicator of economic globalization is the correlation of national GDP growth rates (Grimes 1993). This shows the extent to which periods of national economic growth and stagnation have been synchronized across countries. In a fully integrated global economy it would be expected that growth and stagnation periods would be synchronized across countries and so there would be a high correlation of national growth rates. Grimes shows that, contrary to the hypothesis of a secular upward trend toward increasing global integration, the correlation among national growth rates fluctuates cyclically over the past two centuries. In a data series from 1860 to 1988 Grimes found two periods in which national economic growth decline sequences are highly correlated across countries: - 1913-1927; and after 1970. Before and in between these peaks are periods of very low synchronization. Further research needs to be done to determine the temporal patterns of different sorts of economic globalization. At this point we can say that the step-function version of a sudden recent leap to globalization can be rejected. The evidence we have indicates that there are both long-term secular trends and huge cyclical oscillations. Trade globalization shows a long-term trend with a big dip during the depression of the 1930s. The investment globalization indicates a cycle with at least two peaks, one before World War I and one after 1980. Grimes’s indicator of synchronous economic growth indicates a cyclical fluctuation with one peak in the 1920s and another since 1970. These results, especially those that imply cycles, indicate that change occurs relatively quickly and that the most recent period of globalization shares important features with earlier periods of intense international economic interaction. The question of the similarities and differences between the most recent wave and earlier waves of globalization is clearly an important one. systemic cycles of accumulation Giovanni Arrighi (1994) shows how hegemony in the modern world system has evolved in a series of “systemic cycles of accumulation” (SCAs) in which finance capital has employed different forms of organization and different relationships with organized state power. These qualitative organizational changes have accompanied the secular increase in the power of money and markets as regulatory forces in the modern world-system. The SCAs have been occurring in the Europe-centered world-system since at least the fourteenth century. Arrighi’s model shows both the similarities and the differences in the relationships that obtain between financial capital and states within the different systemic cycles of accumulation. The British SCA and the American SCA had both similarities and important differences. The main differences that Arrighi emphasizes are the “internalization of transaction costs” (represented by the vertical integration of TNCs) and the extent to which the U.S. tried to create “organized capitalism” on a global scale. The British SCA had fewer global firms and pushed hard for international free trade. The U.S. SCA is characterized by a much heavier focus on global firms and by a more structured approach to “global governance” possibly intended to produce economic growth in other core regions, especially those that are geopolitically strategic. Arrighi argues that President Roosevelt used the power of the hegemonic state to try to create a balanced world of capitalist growth. This sometimes meant going against the preferences of finance capital and U.S. corporations. For example, the Japanese miracle was made possible because the U.S. government prevented U.S. corporations from turning Japan (and Korea) into just one more dependent and peripheralized country. This policy of enlightened global Keynesianism was continued in a somewhat constrained form under later presidents, albeit in the guise of domestic “military Keynesianism” justified by the Soviet threat. In this interpretation the big companies and the finance capitalists returned to power with the decline in competitiveness of the U.S. economy. The rise of the Eurodollar market forced Nixon to abandon the Bretton Woods financial structure, and this was followed by ReaganismThatcherism, IMF structural adjustment, streamlining, deregulation and the delegitimation of anything that constrained the desires of global capital investment. The idea that we are all subject to the forces of a global market-place, and that any constraint on the freedom to invest will result in a deficit of “competitiveness,” is a powerful justification for destroying the institutions of the “Second Wave” (e.g. labor unions, welfare, agricultural subsidies, etc.).4 Under conditions of increased economic globalization the ability of national states to protect their citizens from world market forces decreases. This results increasing inequalities within countries, and increasing levels of dis-satisfaction compared to the relative harmony of national integration achieved under the Keynesian regimes. It is also produces political reactions, especially national-populist movements.5 Indeed, Philip McMichael (1996) attributes the anti-government movements now occurring in the U.S. West, including the bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City, to the frustrations caused by the deregulation of U.S. agriculture. It would also be useful to investigate the temporal patterns of the other types of globalization: cultural,6 political, technological and ecological. Of interest too are the relationships between these and economic globalization. Much empirical work needs to be done to operationalize these concepts and to assemble the relevant information. Here, for now, I will hypothesize that all these types exhibit both long-run secular and cyclical features. I will also surmise that cultural and political globalization are lagged behind the secular upward trend of economic globalization. the politics of globalization This last hypothesis bears on the question of adjustments of political and social institutions to increases in economic and technological globalization. I would submit that the current period of economic globalization has occurred in part due to technological changes that are linked to Kondratieff waves, and in part because of the profit squeezes and declining hegemony of the U.S. economy in the larger world market. 7 The financial aspects of the current period of economic globalization began when President Nixon canceled the Bretton Woods agreement in response to pressures on the value of the U.S. dollar coming from the rapidly growing Eurodollar market (Harvey 1995). This occurred in 1967, and this date is used by many to mark the beginning of a K-wave downturn. The saturation of the world market demand for the products of the post-World War II upswing, the constraints on capital accumulation posed by business unionism and the political entitlements of the welfare states in core countries caused a profit squeeze that motivated large firms and investors and their political helpers to try to break out of these constraints. The possibilities for global investment opened up by new communications and information technology created new maneuverability for capital. The demise of the Soviet Union8 added legitimacy to the revitalized ideology of the free market and this ideology swept the Earth. Not only Reagan and Thatcher, but Eurocommunists and labor governments in both the core and the periphery, adopted the ideology of the “lean state,” deregulation, privatization and the notion that everything must be evaluated in terms of global efficiency and competitiveness. Cultural globalization has been a very long-term upward trend since the emergence of the world religions in which any person, regardless of ethnicity or kinship, could become a member of the moral community by confessing faith in the “universal” god. But moral and political cosmography has usually encompassed a smaller realm than the real dimensions of the objective trade and political/military networks in which people have been involved. What has occurred at the end of the twentieth century is a near convergence between subjective cosmography and objective networks. The main cause of this is probably the practical limitation of human habitation to the planet Earth. But the long-run declining costs of transportation and communications are also an important element. Whatever the causes, the emergent reality is one in which consciousness embraces (or goes beyond) the real systemic networks of interaction. This geographical feature of the global system is one of its uniquenesses, and it makes possible for the future a level of normative order that has not existed since human societies were very small and egalitarian (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997a). The ideology of globalization has undercut the support and the rationale behind all sorts of so-called Second Wave institutions—labor unions, socialist parties, welfare programs, and communist states. While these institutions have not been destroyed everywhere, the politicians of the right (e.g. Newt Gingrich in the U.S.) have explicitly argued for their elimination. At the same time, the very technologies that made capitalist economic globalization possible also have the potential to allow those who do not benefit from the free reign of capital to organize new forms of resistance, or to revitalize old forms. It is now widely agreed by many, even in the financial community, that the honeymoon of neo-liberalism will eventually end and that the rough edges of global capitalism will need to be buffed. Patrick Buchanan, a conservative candidate for the U.S. presidency in 1996, tried to capitalize on popular resentment of corporate downsizing. The Wall Street Journal has reported that stock analysts worry about the “lean and mean” philosophy becoming a fad that has the potential to delegitimate the business system and to create political backlashes. This was expressed in the context of a discussion of the announcement of huge bonuses for AT&T executives following another round of downsizing. I already mentioned the difficulties that states are having in controlling communications on the Internet. I do not believe the warnings of those who predict a massive disruption of civilization by hordes of sociopaths waging “cyberwar”9 But I do think that the new communications technologies provide new opportunities for the less powerful to organize themselves to respond should global capitalism run them over or leave them out. The important question is what are the most useful organizational forms for resistance? What we already see are all sorts of nutty localisms, nationalisms and a proliferation of identity politics. The militias of the U.S. West are ordering large amounts of fertilizer with which to resist the coming of the “Blue Helmets”—a fantasized world state that is going to take away their handguns and assualt rifles.10 Localisms and specialized identities are the postmodern political forms that are supposedly produced by information technology, flexible specialization, and global capitalism (Harvey 1989). I think that at least some of this trend is a result of desperation and the demise of plausible alternatives in the face of the ideological hegemony of neoliberalism and the much-touted triumph of efficiency over justice. Be that as it may, a historical perspective on the latest phase of globalization allows us to see the long-run patterns of interaction between capitalist expansion and the movements of opposition that have tried to protect people from the negative aspects of market forces and exploitation. And this perspective has implications for going beyond the impasse of the present to build a more cooperative and humane global system (Boswell and Chase-Dunn 1999). the spiral of capitalism and socialism The interaction between expansive commodification and resistance movements can be denoted as “the spiral of capitalism and socialism.” The world-systems perspective provides a view of the long-term interaction between the expansion and deepening of capitalism and the efforts of people to protect themselves from exploitation and domination. The historical development of the communist states is explained as part of a long-run spiraling interaction between expanding capitalism and socialist counter-responses. The history and developmental trajectory of the communist states can be explained as socialist movements in the semiperiphery that attempted to transform the basic logic of capitalism, but which ended up using socialist ideology to mobilize industrialization for the purpose of catching up with core capitalism. The spiraling interaction between capitalist development and socialist movements can be seen in the history of labor movements, socialist parties and communist states over the last 200 years. This long-run comparative perspective enables one to see recent events in China, Russia and Eastern Europe in a framework that has implications for the future of social democracy. The metaphor of the spiral means this: both capitalism and socialism affect one another’s growth and organizational forms. Capitalism spurs socialist responses by exploiting and dominating peoples, and socialism spurs capitalism to expand its scale of production and market integration and to revolutionize technology. Defined broadly, socialist movements are those political and organizational means by which people try to protect themselves from market forces, exploitation and domination, and to build more cooperative institutions. The sequence of industrial revolutions, by which capitalism has restructured production and taken control of labor, have stimulated a series of political organizations and institutions created by workers to protect their livelihoods. This happened differently under different political and economic conditions in different parts of the world-system. Skilled workers created guilds and craft unions. Less skilled workers created industrial unions. Sometimes these coalesced into labor parties that played important roles in supporting the development of political democracies, mass education and welfare states (Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992). In other regions workers were less politically successful, but managed at least to protect access to rural areas or subsistence plots for a fall-back or hedge against the insecurities of employment in capitalist enterprises. To some extent the burgeoning contemporary “informal sector” in both core and peripheral societies provides such a fall-back. The mixed success of workers’ organizations also had an impact on the further development of capitalism. In some areas workers or communities were successful at raising the wage bill or protecting the environment in ways that raised the costs of production for capital. When this happened capitalists either displaced workers by automating them out of jobs or capital migrated to where fewer constraints allowed cheaper production. The process of capital flight is not a new feature of the world-system. It has been an important force behind the uneven development of capitalism and the spreading scale of market integration for centuries. Labor unions and socialist parties were able to obtain some power in certain states, but capitalism became yet more international. Firm size increased. International markets became more and more important to successful capitalist competition. Fordism, the employment of large numbers of easily-organizable workers in centralized production locations, has been supplanted by “flexible accumulation” (small firms producing small customized products) and global sourcing (the use of substitutable components from broadly dispersed competing producers), are all production strategies that make traditional labor organizing approaches much less viable. communist states in the world-system Socialists were able to gain state power in certain semiperipheral states and use this power to create political mechanisms of protection against competition with core capital. This was not a wholly new phenomenon. As discussed below, capitalist semiperipheral states had done and were doing similar things. But, the communist states claimed a fundamentally oppositional ideology in which socialism was allegedly a superior system that would eventually replace capitalism. Ideological opposition is a phenomenon which the capitalist world-economy has seen before. The geopolitical and economic battles of the Thirty Years War were fought in the name of Protestantism against Catholicism. The content of the ideology may make some difference for the internal organization of states and parties, but every contender must be able to legitimate itself in the eyes and hearts of its cadre. The claim to represent a qualitatively different and superior socio-economic system is not evidence that the communist states were indeed structurally autonomous from world capitalism. The communist states severely restricted the access of core capitalist firms to their internal markets and raw materials, and this constraint on the mobility of capital was an important force behind the post-World War II upsurge in the spatial scale of market integration and a new revolution of technology. In certain areas capitalism was driven to further revolutionize technology or to improve living conditions for workers and peasants because of the demonstration effect of propinquity to a communist state. U.S. support for state-led industrialization of Japan and Korea (in contrast to U.S. policy in Latin America) is only understandable as a geopolitical response to the Chinese revolution. The existence of “two superpowers”—one capitalist and one communist—in the period since World War II provided a fertile context for the success of international liberalism within the “capitalist” bloc. This was the political/military basis of the rapid growth of transnational corporations and the latest revolutionary “time-space compression” (Harvey 1989). This technological revolution has once again restructured the international division of labor and created a new regime of labor regulation called “flexible accumulation.” The process by which the communist states have become reintegrated into the capitalist world-system has been long, as described below. But, the final phase of reintegration was provoked by the inability to be competitive with the new form of capitalist regulation. Thus, capitalism spurs socialism, which spurs capitalism, which spurs socialism again in a wheel that turns and turns while getting larger. The economic reincorporation of the communist states into the capitalist world-economy did not occur recently and suddenly. It began with the mobilization toward autarchic industrialization using socialist ideology, an effort that was quite successful in terms of standard measures of economic development. Most of the communist states were increasing their percentage of world product and energy consumption up until the 1980s. The economic reincorporation of the communist states moved to a new stage of integration with the world market and foreign firms in the 1970s. Andre Gunder Frank (1980:chapter 4) documented a trend toward reintegration in which the communist states increased their exports for sale on the world market, increased imports from the avowedly capitalist countries, and made deals with transnational firms for investments within their borders. The economic crisis in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union was not much worse than the economic crisis in the rest of the world during the global economic downturn that began in the late 1960s (see Boswell and Peters 1990, Table 1). Data presented by World Bank analysts indicates that GDP growth rates were positive in most of the “historically planned economies” in Europe until 1989 or 1990 (Marer et al, 1991: Table 7a). Put simply, the big transformations that occurred in the Soviet Union and China after 1989 were part of a process that had long been underway since the 1970s. The big socio-political changes were a matter of the superstructure catching up with the economic base. The democratization of these societies is, of course, a welcome trend, but democratic political forms do not automatically lead to a society without exploitation or domination. The outcomes of current political struggles are rather uncertain in most of the ex-communist countries. New types of authoritarian regimes seem at least as likely as real democratization. As trends in the last two decades have shown, austerity regimes, deregulation and marketization within nearly all of the communist states occurred during the same period as similar phenomena in non-communist states. The synchronicity and broad similarities between Reagan/Thatcher deregulation and attacks on the welfare state, austerity socialism in most of the rest of the world, and increasing pressures for marketization in the Soviet Union and China are all related to the B-phase downturn of the Kondratieff wave, as are the current moves toward austerity and privatization in many semiperipheral and peripheral states. The trend toward privatization, deregulation and market-based solutions among parties of the Left in almost every country is thoroughly documented by Lipset (1991). Nearly all socialists with access to political power have abandoned the idea of doing more than buffing off the rough edges of capitalism. The way in which the pressures of a stagnating world economy impact upon national policies certainly varies from country to country, but the ability of any single national society to construct collective rationality is limited by its interaction within the larger system. The most recent expansion of capitalist integration, termed “globalization of the economy,” has made autarchic national economic planning seem anachronistic. Yet, a political reaction against economic globalization is now under way in the form of revived ex-communist parties, economic nationalism (e.g., Pat Buchanan, the Brazilian military) and a coalition of oppositional forces who are critiquing the ideological hegemony of neo-liberalism (e.g., Ralph Nader, environmentalists, populists of the right, etc.). Political Implications of the World-System Perspective The age of U.S. hegemonic decline and the rise of post-modernist philosophy have cast the liberal ideology of the European Enlightenment (science, progress, rationality, liberty, democracy and equality) into the dustbin of totalizing universalisms. It is alleged that these values have been the basis of imperialism, domination and exploitation and, thus, they should be cast out in favor of each group asserting its own set of values. Note that self-determination and a considerable dose of multiculturalism (especially regarding religion) were already central elements in Enlightenment liberalism. The structuralist and historical materialist world-systems approach poses this problem of values in a different way. The problem with the capitalist world-system has not been with its values. The philosophy of liberalism is fine. It has quite often been an embarrassment to the pragmatics of imperial power and has frequently provided justifications for resistance to domination and exploitation. The philosophy of the enlightenment has never been a major cause of exploitation and domination. Rather, it was the military and economic power generated by capitalism that made European hegemony possible.

## Case

#### The disappearance of antitrust law from public discourse has cemented corporate power. A paradigm shift is possible, but requires making monopolies a political issue again, and advocating legal change.

David Dayen 15, author of *Monopolized: Life in the Age of Corporate Power (2020)* and *Chain of Title: How Three Ordinary Americans Uncovered Wall Street's Great Foreclosure Fraud*, “Bring Back Antitrust,” The American Prospect, Vol. 26, No. 4, Fall 2015, lexis.

In 1964, historian Richard Hofstadter gave a speech at the University of California, Berkeley, titled "What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?" He wondered why anti-monopoly sentiment ceased to become the subject of public agitation. "Once the United States had an antitrust movement without antitrust prosecutions," Hofstadter said. "In our time, there have been antitrust prosecutions without an antitrust movement."

Now we have lost both the movement and the prosecutions. When we talk about banks that are too big to fail, we're talking about antitrust. When we talk about the high cost of health care, we're talking about antitrust. So many of our key domestic issues are fundamentally questions about whether we should tolerate monopolies, or dismantle them. But this formulation-a centerpiece of public debate in the last robberbaron era between the 1880s and 1910s-has all but disappeared from popular discourse.

Can anti-monopoly sentiment be revived? When New York's Working Families Party first recruited Zephyr Teachout to run for governor, she said she would only do it if she could talk about monopolies. "They polled it, and they were correct that nobody knew what I was talking about," Teachout says. But when she eventually ran an insurgent campaign against incumbent Andrew Cuomo, she was determined to talk about it anyway.

"The minute you got past the sound-bite level, people responded to the concentration of power," Teachout says. They did campaign events at places where people paid their cable bills, using the pending Comcast-Time Warner merger, eventually abandoned, as the hook. She engaged farmers in upstate New York about monopsony power, and discussed Amazon and big banks on the stump. And it resonated. After only one month of campaigning, Teachout won 35 percent of the vote, with particular strength in upstate counties where farming issues were prominent.

"The Tea Party talks to people and says, 'You're out of power because government is taking it away from you,"' Teachout says. "Far too often, Democrats say, 'You're wrong, you're not out of power.' That's dissonant with our lived experience. You're out of power ... because your priorities don't matter and JPMorgan's do."

Beyond Teachout, you can see through the haze the stirrings of a grassroots antitrust agenda. The greatest anti-monopoly victory of the modern age, the Federal Communications Commission's net-neutrality rules, owed much to a smart, tech-savvy movement that leveraged big protest platforms. Web-native activists fought for the decentralized power of the Internet, without gatekeepers collecting tolls along the way. And they made the connection to things like the Comcast-Time Warner merger, which failed amid public outcry.

"After this existential threat to the Web, you see the same groups becoming interested in the deep history of anti-monopoly laws," Teachout says. "It's kind of an exciting intellectual moment, a fusion between old-school farmers who have been complaining for 30 years and new net-neutrality dreamers."

Monopolists have long used technological advances to consolidate power, from Gilded Age tycoons leveraging control of railroads and telegraphs to Amazon using its first-mover status in e-commerce to squeeze book producers, or Google harvesting traffic to their market-leading search engine to serve ads. It's easy to translate the need for a neutral platform for websites into the same need for book sales or car ride-sharing.

The European Union, in fact, did file formal antitrust charges against Google, accusing it of forcing search engine users into its own shopping platforms, and bundling Android phones with their own apps, to prevent competitors from performing the same functions. The FTC shut down its own investigation into Google over the same concerns in 2013. But an inadvertent disclosure revealed that the agency's Bureau of Competition recommended bringing a lawsuit, arguing that Google's conduct "has resulted-and will result-in real harm to consumers and to innovation in the online search and advertising markets." The political leadership ignored the recommendation.

The next administration must show "leadership that has a certain intellectual curiosity," says Maurice Stucke, pointing to the Google case as a missed opportunity. An alteration in posture would make enforcement far more vigorous, and bringing more cases will give litigators more experience and confidence to negotiate the judicial barriers. The American Antitrust Institute plans to create a transition document for the incoming administration, as they did for the Obama transition.

But at a time of political disempowerment, teaching about the dangers of monopolies and how we have the laws on the books to fight them, and creating upward pressure to do it, offers great potential for a paradigm shift. Connecting Senator Elizabeth Warren's fight against a rigged financial system and Al Franken's fight against media concentration can spark broader political energy.

You could see this potential in Washington, D.C., where in August, the city's Public Service Commission rejected a merger between energy firms Exelon and Pepco, citing "more active participation by parties and interested persons than any other proceeding in the Commission's more than a century of operations." Activists argued a giant Exelon conglomerate would fail to devote resources to the city's clean-energy goals, connecting anti-monopolization with fighting climate change.

There are a lot of reasons for runaway monopolies: an intellectual hijacking by Chicago-school conservative economists, the over-financialization of the economy, a failure of federal antitrust enforcement. But perhaps the biggest reason is that antitrust policy has become divorced from politics, confined to specialized lawyers and mathematicians instead of citizens and activists. Without grassroots momentum, politicians and enforcement agencies can safely ignore the issue. That's the challenge for a small band of academics, think-tank fellows, and activists: to make monopolies a vital issue again, connecting with the severe economic anxiety Americans feel.

## Cap

#### Communities are pre-determined by capitalism – only state engagement solves.

Robinson 14 – Professor of sociology at UC Santa Barbara [William, *Global capitalism and the crisis of humanity*, Cambridge Univ. Press, pp. 222-4]

How viable are transformative strategies based on the notion that local communities can withdraw from global capitalism? The attempt to create alter- native communities at the local level, to set up cooperatives, to decentralize circuits of food supply, to withdraw from the global agro-industrial regime, to decentralize energy distribution and consumption, and to construct cooperative enterprises and local solidarity economies are necessary and important. Yet they do not in themselves resolve the problem of power. In the absence of a strategy to confront the state and to transform the system from within we are left with the dangerous illusion that the world can be changed without resolving this matter of power. Global capitalism is now internal to practically all communities on the planet. It has spun webs of worldwide interdependency that link us all to a larger totality. Global capitalism is indeed totalizing. The notion that one can escape from global capitalism not by defeating it but by creating alternative spaces or islands of utopia ignores the unpleasant fact that no matter how one wills it to be so, these spaces cannot disengage from capitalism, if for no other reason than that capital and the state will penetrate – often forcibly – and continuously reincorporate these spaces.

Localized solutions are too piecemeal to confront the power of global capitalism – to change the global balance of class and social forces. There is no way to get around the fact that the TCC holds class power over humanity, and the TNS exercises multiple forms of direct, coercive power. The state exercises power over us. This fact will not go away by ignoring this power. It is illusory to suppose that it can be countered by constructing autonomous communities, which in fact are not autonomous because such communities cannot extricate themselves from the webs of global capitalism, and even if they could, in theory, the state would not allow them to; it would use the force of its law to reincorporate such communities. There is no getting around confrontation with the state, no avoiding a struggle to wrest state power away from capital, its agents and allies. The struggle to withdraw from global capitalism, no matter how important, must be coupled with a struggle to overthrow global capitalism, to destroy the transnational capitalist state.

## Case

#### 2] Learning about the history of antitrust is essential to effective strategies.

Ron Knox 20. Senior researcher and writer at the Institute for Local Self-Reliance, 10/8/20. “Congress’s big tech report shows why antitrust history is so important.” https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/10/08/congress-big-tech-anti-trust/?outputType=amp

This week, Congress released a report on big tech monopolies that makes clear what so many Americans instinctively know: A handful of powerful corporations rule over our lives and our economy. The report details the actions the four big tech platforms — Amazon, Google, Facebook and Apple — have taken in gaining and preserving their monopoly power across numerous markets. (Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos owns The Washington Post.) The report’s prescription for undoing their power is just as clear: We must break them up. Alongside this essential recommendation, the report also calls for strengthening the antitrust laws and adopting new rules to ensure the dominant platforms do not exploit their power. If we fail to confront the tech monopolies head on, the report argues, we relinquish our control over the way we shop, sell and speak to one another.

While the report itself falls in line with the other great anti-monopoly documents in the history of the U.S. Congress, it also situates the big tech companies in their historical context, likening them to “the kinds of monopolies we last saw in the era of oil barons and railroad tycoons.” That’s a valuable approach, because the United States can allay the situation the report describes only if policymakers situate it in its proper historical context. The big tech companies may be relatively new, but their monopolistic practices aren’t unique. And neither are the remedies — or what would happen if Washington implemented them.

A century ago, another cabal of powerful businesses controlled much of the American economy. It was the dawn of the formal American anti-monopoly movement. The Sherman Act, our first antitrust law passed some decades before in 1890, had been successfully used to break up the most notorious monopolies of the time, Standard Oil and American Tobacco. But despite these early victories against corporate control, the rot at the heart of the economy persisted.

Wall Street financiers, led by J.P. Morgan, bankrolled industrial titans in their pursuit of monopoly. Rather than the American people or a democratic market picking winners and losers, Morgan’s capital paid for the mergers and permitted the cutthroat pricing that created U.S. Steel, AT&T, General Electric and the railroad monopolies. As historian J. Bradford DeLong wrote, “Morgan and a small band of fellow financiers exercised a degree of control over corporate America not even remotely paralleled by any group since World War II.” The public called this dominance over the democratic market “the money trust.”

In 1912, the House convened a group of lawmakers, led by Rep. Arsène Pujo, to investigate the money trust and its effect on major U.S. industries. The Pujo Committee’s findings led to major reforms, including the passage of the Clayton Act, which banned corporate concentration through mergers and barred people from controlling an industry by sitting on the boards of directors of competing companies. At the same time, Congress created the Federal Trade Commission to use the new law to fight and prevent monopoly power.

Congress’s democratic intervention worked. By January 1914, as Congress and the public chastised the money trust, Morgan announced he would withdraw from more than two dozen directorships. Although the grip of Wall Street finance wouldn’t be fully broken until the Great Depression and passage of the Glass-Steagall Act two decades later, Morgan had relinquished control of the railroads and AT&T.

#### 3] Debates about antitrust are critical to understanding the fault lines of capitalism.

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Such an extreme concentration of economic power in the hands of one corporation raises urgent questions about the health of our economy and our democracy. As I wrote last week, Congress is beginning to ask those questions. As denizens of a region transformed by Amazon’s rise, we’d all do well to ask them, too,

and that means wrapping our heads around “antitrust” — the area of public policy and law intended to address the perils of excessive corporate power. It’s a tricky subject, and not merely because antitrust, like any corner of the law, has its share of intricacies, arcane terminology and subtle disputes. It’s also confusing because antitrust lies at one of the fault lines where the ideology of the capitalist marketplace begins to self-destruct.